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ABSTRACT
Service Oriented Computing is emerging as the main ap-
proach to build distributed enterprise applications on the
Web. The widespread use of Web services is hindered by
the lack of adequate security and privacy support. In this
paper, we present a novel framework for enforcing access
control in conversation-based Web services. Our approach
takes into account the conversational nature of Web ser-
vices. This is in contrast with existing approaches to access
control enforcement that assume a Web service as a set of in-
dependent operations. Furthermore, our approach achieves
a tradeo® between the need to protect Web service's access
control policies and the need to disclose to clients the por-
tion of access control policies related to the conversations
they are interested in. This is important to avoid situations
where the client cannot progress in the conversation due to
the lack of required security requirements. We introduce the
concept of k-trustworthiness that de¯nes the conversations
for which a client can provide credentials maximizing the
likelihood that it will eventually hit a ¯nal state.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Service Oriented Computing is poised to be the leading
approach to build (distributed) applications on the Web us-
ing Web services as the basic building blocks. Web services
provide a standard framework for interoperating indepen-
dently developed Web applications. Generally speaking, a
Web service is a set of related functionalities that can be
programmatically accessed through the Web. These func-
tionalities represent the di®erent operations made available
by the Web service and are described in its service descrip-
tion using the WSDL standard language. While many in
the literature treated Web services as a set of independent
single operations, interacting with real world Web services
involves generally a sequence of invocations of several of
their operations, referred to as conversation. A simple ex-
ample is a bookstore Web service; buying a book involves
generally searching for the book, browsing the details and
reviews about this book, adding the book to the shopping
cart, checking out, paying, etc. It is then important to rep-
resent Web services in some formalism that would represent
all potential conversations that can take place between the
Web service and the client.
As organizations increase their use of Web services and
adopt them as the primary tool to build fairly complex dis-
tributed systems, security and policy disclosure become cru-
cial [14]. It is well acknowledged that the wide spread adop-
tion of Web services cannot happen without e®ective solu-
tions for security issues. In this paper, we focus on access
control and the limited disclosure of access control policies.
An access control model restricts the set of clients or sub-
jects that can invoke Web service's operations. Since clients
ws are not known a priori, we adopt credentials to enforce
access control. Credentials are signed assertions describing
properties of a subject that are used to establish trust be-
tween two unknown communicating parties before allowing
access to information or services. Access control policies de-
¯ne rules stating that only subjects with certain credentials
satisfying speci¯c conditions can invoke a given operation of
the Web service.
While access control has been widely studied in the liter-
ature and especially in database systems [7], only recently
work on security for Web services has emerged as an impor-
tant part of the Web service saga [19, 15, 1, 6]. Most ap-
proaches in the literature assume a single operation model
where operations are independent from each other. Access
control is either enforced at the level of the entire Web ser-
vice or at the level of single operations. In the ¯rst approach,the Web service could ask, in advance, the client to provide
all the credentials associated with all operations of that Web
service. This approach guarantees that a subject will always
arrive at the end of whichever conversation. However, it has
the drawback that the subject will become aware of all poli-
cies on the base of which access control is enforced. Another
drawback is that the client may have to submit more creden-
tials than needed. An alternative strategy is to require only
the credentials associated with the next operation that the
client wants to perform. This strategy has the advantage
of asking from the subject only the credentials necessary to
gain access to the requested operation. However, the sub-
ject is continuously solicited to provide credentials for each
transition. In addition, after several steps, the client may
reach a state in which it cannot progress because the lack of
credentials.
It is important to observe that Web services operations
represent a coarse-grained process that takes place in the
application supporting the Web service and usually involves
the consumption of several resources. This shows how im-
portant it is for the Web service to maximize the chance that
a user would reach a ¯nal state to avoid the risk of wasting
resources. This should be balanced with the need to retain
some control on the disclosure of access policies.
In this paper, we propose a conversation-based access con-
trol model that enables service providers to retain some con-
trol on the disclosure of their access control policies while
giving clients some guarantees on the termination of their
interactions. First, we model all possible conversations as
¯nite transition systems (aka ¯nite state machines) [17, 4],
in which ¯nal states represent those ones in which the in-
teraction with the client can be (but no necessarily) ended.
Furthermore, our access control model attempts to to maxi-
mize the likelihood that a client reaches a ¯nal state without
necessarily having to be made aware of all the access control
policies. We introduce a novel concept of k-trustworthiness
where k can be seen as the level of trust that a Web service
has on a client at any point of their interaction. The greater
the level of trust associated with a client, the greater is the
amount of information about access control policies that can
be disclosed to this client. k represents the length of the
conversations, from the current state, such that the client is
requested to provide the credentials to invoke any operation
along these paths. All conversations along these paths will
eventually lead to a ¯nal state after k steps. Thus, the client
is assured that its conversation can eventually terminate. As
we shall see, based on this simple notion of k-trustworthiness,
we are able to develop a °exible (with limited policy disclo-
sure) access control model for conversation-based Web ser-
vices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the related work. In Section 3, we present our
conversation-based access control model for Web services.
In Section 4, we introduce the algorithms used to enforce
access control. In Section 5, we describe how the model can
be implemented in Web service environments. Finally, in
Section 6 we discuss our approach and its advantages. We
also identify the major issues in extending our approach to
composite services.
2. RELATED WORK
Recent papers [3, 4, 13] have argued that a Web service
is more than a set of independent operations. In fact, dur-
ing a Web service's invocation, a client interacts with the
service performing a sequence of operations in a particular
order. Such a sequence is called conversation. Speci¯cally,
[3, 4] adopt a model based on ¯nite transition systems (aka
¯nite state machines) for representing all possible conversa-
tions. The approach of [13] is based on the combined use of
two Web service languages, WS-Conversation (WSCL) and
WS-Agreement, that allows one to specify non-trivial con-
versations in which several messages have to be exchanged
before the service is completed and/or the conversation may
evolve in di®erent ways depending on the state and the needs
of the requesting agents and of the service provider.
As far as security issues in Web services, a fair amount
of related research in this area is due to the industry, with
Regarding security issues in Web services, two major stan-
dards have emerged Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML) and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML). SAML de¯nes an XML framework for exchang-
ing authentication and authorization information for secur-
ing Web services. XACML is an XML framework for spec-
ifying access control policies for web-based resources. Re-
cently it has been extended to specify access control poli-
cies for Web services. Other emerging speci¯cations include
WS-Security and WS-Policy. WS-Security is a speci¯cation
for securing SOAP messages using XML Encryption and
XML Signature standards and attaching security credentials
thereto. WS-Policy is used to describe the security policies
in terms of their characteristics and supported features (such
as required security tokens, encryption algorithms, privacy
rules, etc.).
These proposals do not address the issue of enforcing ac-
cess control policies. Several approaches [19, 15, 1, 6]
suggest some preliminary ideas, but none of them provide
a comprehensive solution. [19] proposes two RBAC (Role
Based Access Control) models, SWS-RBAC, for single Web
services, and CWS-RBAC, for composite Web services. In
both models, a service has a few access modes and a role
is associated with a list of services which clients, who are
assigned that role, have permission to execute. In CWS-
RBAC model, the role to which a client is assigned to ac-
cess a composite service, must be a global role, which is
mapped onto local roles of the service providers of the com-
ponent Web services. [15] proposes an approach for spec-
ifying and enforcing security policies. These are speci¯ed
using a language called WebGuard based on temporal logic
and are processed by an enforcement engine to yield site
and platform-speci¯c access control. This code is integrated
with a Web server and platform speci¯c libraries to enforce
the speci¯ed policies on a given Web service. [1] presents a
Web service architecture for enforcing access control policies
expressed in WS-Policy. The architecture is similar to the
one proposed in the XACML standard and is characterized
by three main components: PDP (Policy Decision Point),
PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) and PAP (Policy Admin-
istration Point). The PDP realizes the interface between a
service and the access control architecture. When a client
requests to invoke a service, the service forwards the request
to the PDP, which, in turn, sends it to the PEP. The PEPasks to the PAP for the policies applicable to the request
and evaluates it against the applicable policies. Then, it re-
turns the ¯nal decision to the PDP, which issues the service
access.
[6] present WS-AC1, an access control model with °exible
granularity in protecting objects and negotiation capabili-
ties. WS-AC1 is based on the speci¯cation of policies stating
conditions on the values of the identity attributes and of the
service parameters that a client must provide to invoke the
service. Conditions may also be speci¯ed against context
parameters, such as time. Further, it is possible to de¯ne
¯ne-grained policies by associating them with a speci¯c ser-
vice as well as coarse-grained policies, to be applied to a
class of services. The negotiation capabilities of WS-AC1
are related both to identity attributes and to service param-
eters. Through a negotiation process, the client is driven
toward the speci¯cation of an access request compliant with
the service description and policies.
The work in [16] considers the issue of modeling and man-
aging trust policies and how to assure that an enforcement
system can migrate, during negotiation of trust policies,
from a previous and no-more valid set of policies to a new
one. Trust policies are modeled as ¯nite state machines, and
lifecycle management is obtained by managing such formal-
izations. This work is indeed orthogonal and complemen-
tary to ours, even if the basic formalism is the same: our
focus is on enforcing access control during service execution,
whereas their focus is on modeling and managing trust ne-
gotiations. Clearly the two approaches can be merged, e.g.,
our the trust policies can be managed according to their
model.
All these proposals describe policy-driven access control
models. They are based on the enforcement of access control
policies stating the requirements to be satis¯ed by a client
to be granted access to a Web service. Since a Web service
can be invoked potentially by anyone, the requirements are
expressed as conditions on the digital credentials owned by
a client. But all these models assume that a Web service
provides just a single operation, or that all operations are
independent.
3. CONVERSATION-BASED ACCESS
CONTROL
In the proposed model, a Web service is characterized by
the set of operations that it exports and constraints on the
possible conversations it can execute. We compactly repre-
sent the service conversations as a ¯nite transition system.
Definition 1. (Transition System). Let WS be a Web
service. The transition system of WS is a tuple T S =
(§;S;s0;±;F) where § is the alphabet of operations o®ered
by the service, S is a ¯nite set of states, s0 2 S is the single
initial state, ± :µ S £ § ! S is the transition function, and
F µ S is the set of ¯nal states(states in which a conversation
may end, but does not necessarily have to).
If ±(si;a) = sj, we represent this as si
a ¡! sj, and we call
a the label of the transition. The transition function can be
extended to ¯nite length sequences of operations or conver-
sations (traces [17]). Given a conversation c : a1;a2;:::an,
and two states s0 and sn, we say that s0 evolves in sn (rep-
completeTransaction
addToCart
checkOut
saveForLater
S1
S2
S3 S4
S0
chooseItem
Figure 1: eShop service's transition system
resented as s0
c =) sn) i® 9 s
0 such that s0
a1 ¡! s
0 and
s
0 a2;:::an =) sn.
Example 1. Figure 1 represents the transition system of
a simple retail Web service eShop, selling some goods. The
di®erent labels represent the operations that a client can in-
voke from any given state and are self-explaining. Final
states are represented by gray circles. A client can be in-
volved in di®erent conversations with the service. The client
can choose for an item (chooseItem), then can add to the
cart (addToCart). Further, the client can decide to buy the
item (checkOut and then completeTransaction operations)
or postpone the purchase (saveForLater) and end the inter-
action.
Credentials are the mean to establish trust between a
client and the service provider. They are assertions about a
given client, referred to as the owner, issued by trusted third
parties called Certi¯cation Authorities (CAs). They are dig-
itally signed using the private key of the issuer CA and can
be veri¯ed using the issuer's public key. A credential con-
tains typically a set of arbitrary properties characterizing
the owner and are speci¯ed via (name,value) pairs. Each
credential has a type based on the set of attribute names in
the credential.
Definition 2. (Credential). A credential C is a tuple
(Issuer;Owner;T ype;Attr) where Issuer is the name of
the CA who issues the credential, Owner is the name of the
credential owner, T ype identi¯es the type of the credential.
and Attr = (Ai;:::;An) is the set of attributes character-
izing the T ype of the credential. An attribute Ai is a pair
(nameAi;valueAi), where nameAi is the name of the at-
tribute Ai and valueAi is a value in the attribute domain
domAi of Ai.
Conditions on the attributes in a credential specify the
security requirements of the service provider. An attribute
condition AC is an expression of the form nameAi op k,
where nameAi is an attribute name, op is a comparison op-
erator and k is a constant value in domAi. We say that acredential C : (Issuer;Owner;T ype;Attr) satis¯es an at-
tribute condition AC: nameAi op k (denoted as C B AC)
if and only if 9 Al 2 Attr such that nameAl = nameAi in
AC and valueAl makes true nameAi op k.
We denote with term T a couple hT ypeC;CCi, where
T ypeC is a credential type and CC is a set (eventually empty)
of attribute conditions. These attribute conditions are com-
bined using classical boolean operators.
Definition 3. (Operation Access Control Policy). Let
T S = (§;S;s0;±;F) be the transition system of a Web ser-
vice WS and o the identi¯er of an operation in §. An oper-
ation access control policy for o is an expression of the form
P : o Ã T1;T2;:::Tn, n ¸ 1 where T1;T2;:::Tn are terms
and o is the Web service operation guarded by the access
control policy.
The semantics of an access control policy is that, given
a set of credentials, the access to the operation is granted
i® the credentials satis¯es all the attribute conditions (i.e.,
C B T1 and C B T2 and ::: C B Tn). As discussed in many
logical formalizations (e.g., [9, 11]), the access to the Web
service operation can be checked through a reasoning service
that veri¯es if the access request is a logical consequence of
the policy and the credentials.
Definition 4. (Conversation Access Control Policy).
Let T S = (§;S;s0;±;F) be the transition system of
a Web service WS, c : a1;:::ak a conversation in
S, a1;:::ak identi¯ers of operations in §, and P1 :
a1 Ã T11;:::T1n1, ..., Pk : ak Ã Tk1;:::Tknk
the corresponding operation access control policies. A
conversation access control policy for c is an expres-
sion of the form: c Ã T11;:::T1n1;:::Tk1;:::;Tknk
where T11;:::T1n1;:::Tk1 is the conjunction of the terms in
P1...Pk.
This de¯nition captures the intuition that a client, owing
a set of credentials satisfying a conversation access control
policy is granted access to all the operations constituting
the conversation. If the conversation is such that it reaches
a ¯nal state, then the satisfaction of the policy assures that
the client will be authorized up to reaching its own goal.
The service provider will not be forced to deny access to
some operations in the middle of the conversation due to
lack of authorization.
Example 1 (cont.) An example of access control policies
for operations addToCart and saveForLater are respec-
tively:
P1 : addToCart Ã CreditCard Holder(Type = MasterCard)
P2 : saveForLater Ã Subscribed Member.
Policy P1 states that only the clients having a MasterCard
can perform operation addToCart, while policy P2 authorizes
only the subscribed clients to execute saveForLater. The
conversation access control policy for the conversation C:
addToCart ¢ saveForLater is:
C Ã CreditCard Holder(Type = MasterCard);
Subscribed Member.
Definition 5. (Trustworthiness Level). Let T S =
(§;S;s0;±;F) be the transition system of a Web service WS
and s 2 S be a state. A trustworthiness level for s is the
length of a conversation such that s
c =) t) with t 2 F.
A trustworthiness level represents the length of a conver-
sation, from a given state s in the transition system, that
leads to a ¯nal state.
Definition 6. (k-Trust Policy). Let T S =
(§;S;s0;±;F) be the transition system of Web service
WS and k a trustworthiness level computed on s 2 S. A
k-trust policy is an expression of the form ks Ã T1;T2;:;Tn,
n ¸ 1, where T1;T2;:::Tn are terms and ks is a trustwor-
thiness level for state s.
A k-trust policy states the type of credentials and the con-
ditions on the credential attributes a client, in state s, must
provide in order to be assigned to a trustworthiness level k.
We use the concept of trustworthiness level to limit the dis-
closure of service provider's access control policies. There-
fore, when a client is assigned the trustworthiness level k (on
the basis of an appropriate k-trust policy), the enforcement
system asks only the credentials needed to satisfy all the
conversation access control policies associated with the con-
versations from the current state to ¯nal states and having
length less or equal to k.
Example 1 (cont.) Let us consider the start state
(labeled with S0) in Figure 1 and determine the po-
tential conversations. These potential conversations
that lead to a ¯nal state and that we need to con-
sider to compute the k-trustworthiness levels are:
(1) chooseItem ¢ addToCart ¢ saveForLater; (2)
chooseItem¢addToCart¢checkOut¢completeTransaction;
and (3) chooseItem¢addToCart¢checkOut¢
completeTransaction¢chooseItem¢addToCart¢
saveForLater. Adding more conversations will be useless
from access control perspective since the same conver-
sation will be repeated. Hence there are 3 di®erent
k-trustworthiness levels: f3;4;7g. For instance, the k3-trust
policy to assign a client to trustworthiness level 3 is of the
form k3 Ã PictureID(Age > 18): it means that if the client
is older then eighteen is entrusted with trustworthiness level
3. Such a client has to ful¯ll the access control policies
associated with the conversations having length less or equal
to 3. These conversations include the following operations:
fchooseItemg, addToCart, and saveForLaterg.
4. ACCESS CONTROL ENFORCEMENT
The main feature of the enforcement system proposed in
this paper is that access control is enforced by considering
conversations, thus maximizing the likelihood that a client
reaches a ¯nal state and does not drop o® due to lack of au-
thorization. The idea is to determine, whenever needed and
in any step of the interaction with the client (i.e., at each
state of the transition system), the appropriate trustworthi-
ness level k to assign to the client. This requires knowing
all potential trust levels at any state. The level assigned to
the client is determined based on the k-trust policies. If the
client provides the required credentials, the likelihood that
it will end up to a ¯nal state without lacking authorizations
is high. Clearly, the client is not forced to follow one of the
conversations it has been authorized to; this is why we refer
to \high likelihood" and not to \guarantee" that the client
will reach a ¯nal state. At some states of the conversationsde¯ned by k, the client may decide to take a di®erent conver-
sation that is not included in the ones it has been authorized
to, a longer conversation for example. If this is the case, the
current trustworthiness level k is recalculated on the basis of
the potential levels at the current state and new credentials
are required.
The challenge now is that given a transition system, we
need to determine for each state all possible trustworthiness
levels from that state as well as the possible conversations
that would de¯ne the corresponding access policies. We base
our solution on the following observations:
² For an acyclic transition system, the set of potential
paths leading from any state to any ¯nal state is ¯nite.
This set can be easily calculated by a simple traversal
of the graph of the transition system.
² If from a given state, a conversation involves a cycle,
an in¯nite number of paths are possible to arrive to a
¯nal state within or while traversing this cycle.
² Since we are dealing with access control policies, usu-
ally if an access control policy of an operation a has
been checked against a client, we do not have to check
it again if the client invoke the operation a more than
once.
We clearly see that the main di±culties in traversing the
transition system and determining the potential conversa-
tions relate to the existence of cycles. Before going further,
let us introduce the concept of strongly connected component
(scc for short). A strongly connected component is the max-
imal subgraph of a directed graph such that for every pair of
vertices u, v in the subgraph, there is a directed path from
u to v and a directed path from v to u [18]. The transi-
tion system of a Web service can be regarded as a directed
graph where a transition between two states is a directed
edge, without considering the labeling. Based on the above
concept, an acyclic graph can be produced where nodes rep-
resent the di®erent strongly connected components of the
initial graph. This graph is called the directed graph of the
strongly connected components and is noted G
scc. It can be
e±ciently computed trough the classical Tarjan's algorithm
[18] or more recent optimizations, e.g., [12].
We can then make the following observations on this new
graph: (i) if the initial T S is acyclic then G
scc is T S itself
[10]; (ii) the nodes that are not involved in cycles will remain
unchanged in the new graph; (iii) cycles will be \collapsed"
into strongly connected components and need to be dealt
with in a appropriate way.
For any scc, we need to determine all possible conver-
sations that will lead from an in-going node, i.e., coming
from outside the component, to an out-going node, i.e., go-
ing outside the component. These conversations should have
the properties to cover all potential operations within that
strongly connected component. The overall idea of the algo-
rithm which ¯nds all potential k-trustworthiness levels for
all states, will be: for a given state, determine all subse-
quent strongly connected components, including the one to
which the current state belongs to. The algorithm will then
traverse the transition system from that state and record all
conversations leading to a ¯nal state. By having computed
all possible conversations of all strongly connected compo-
nents, we will be able to ¯nd ¯nite conversations even in the
case of cycles.
Before giving the details of the algorithm, we will need to
introduce several concepts.
An object type SetOf<element>
1for representing set of
<element>s, where <element> can be whichever other object
type. We use the term set in a proper way, to mean a collec-
tion of elements without repetitions and without any order.
We assume to have the = operator on sets, which compares
two homogeneous sets for equality, a method add(<element>
e) for adding a new element, and j j for calculating its di-
mension (number of elements). An object type Sequence is
de¯ned for representing conversations. On such a type, some
methods are de¯ned: (i) length() for having the length of
the sequence, and (ii) set() ! SetOfOperation, which re-
turns the set of all the distinct operations. As an example,
acg.set() = fa;c;gg = acgcgcg.set().
The directed graph of the strongly connected components
of the original transition system is de¯ned as follows:
Definition 7. (Graph of scc). Given a transition sys-
tem T S = (§;S;s0;±;F), the directed graph of the strongly
connected components G
scc = hS
scc;E
scci is the graph with
nodes N
scc and oriented edges E
scc obtained as follows:
N
scc = fc: c is a strongly connected component in T Sg;
E
scc = fhc1;c2i: c1 6= c2 and 9a 2 ±, s1 2 c1, s2 2 c2 such
that s1
a ¡! s2g
Given a state s 2 T S, we refer to the node of G
scc asso-
ciated to the strongly connected component of s as c(s); we
also say that c(s) is the image of s.
In the algorithms presented in the following, we assume
an object type GraphSCC, de¯ned for representing a graph
of scc. On the type GraphSCC, a method projection(Node
c) ! GraphSCC is de¯ned, that takes as input a node c and
returns a new subgraph obtained by considering c and all
nodes reachable by it, i.e., it is the subgraph obtained by
visiting depth-¯rst the graph starting from c.
For each node/scc of G
scc, we know the number of di®er-
ent operations that label transitions among the associated
states of T S. More speci¯cally details, for each scc c, the
set Oc = f a such that s1
a ¡! s2 and c(s1) = c(s2) = c g
can be easily determined. The cardinality of Oc is referred
to as card(c). If the connected component c is the image
of a single state of T S, then its card(c) = 0. On the type
GraphSCC, we de¯ne a method card(Node c) ! Integer
that takes as input a node c and returns its cardinality.
For each node/scc of G
scc, the longest path, among the
shortest ones that (i) starting from an in-going node ¯n-
ish in a distinct out-going node, and (ii) comprise all the
di®erent operations in Oc. More speci¯cally, for each scc
c, a sequence of operations str is said to be covering i®
e
str =) o with e in-going state of c and o out-going state
(c(e) = c(o) = c) and str.set() = Oc. We use the nota-
tion f str for referring to a traversing sequence of operations
2. Then for each scc c, a set Cc is de¯ned: Cc = f g stri
1In the following, we use Type for indicating object types,
and object for indicating object instances. Moreover we will
sloppy on many obvious object types.
2A traversing sequence is not necessarily an Eulerian pathsuch that: (oi 6= oj for i 6= j) and (8strk with oi = ok then
strk.length() ¸ stri.length() g. We denote coverage(c)
= max(stri 2 Cc).
The coverage of a scc can be calculated by generating by
enumeration, which can be done with a simple recursion, all
the paths from any in-going node to an out-going one. A
global array of boolean variables, with dimension equal to
the number of distinct out-going nodes, is used to record
whether the out-going node has been reached, and another
global array of integer variables maintains the length of the
sequence that evolves the in-going node up to the out-going
one. As soon as all the boolean variables are set to true,
meaning that we have found the shortest paths, then the
maximum among the values in the other array is calculated.
In order to close all the recursive instances, each of them
is controlled by a condition on the conjunction of all the
boolean array's values.
On the type GraphSCC, a method coverage(Node c) !
Integer is de¯ned, that takes as input a node c and returns
its coverage.
For each node/scc of G
scc, we de¯ne the rank as follows:
rank(c) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
coverage(c)
if c is the root of G
scc
1 + coverage(c)
+max(rank(m))
where m are all the
possible predecessors
of c
As G
scc is acyclic, the rank of each node can be computed
in three steps: (i) by running a depth-¯rst-search algorithm,
and for each visited node to push on a stack a record, labeled
with the node, containing the predecessor node; (ii) then by
popping the stack, and for each encountered record, to re-
move from the stack all the records with the same state, by
recording the corresponding predecessor node, and to push
in another stack the formula for calculating the rank (at this
point the predecessors are all correctly identi¯ed); (iii) ¯-
nally, by popping the second stack, and for each removed
record, we calculate the rank. We should observe that the
stack now gives the exact order according to which to calcu-
late the formulas: each removed record gives the values to
be used in following records.
Finally, on the type GraphSCC, a method rank(Node c)
! Integer is de¯ned, that takes as input a node c and
returns its rank.
We can now present the algorithms for computing, for
each state of the Web service transition system, the possible
k-levels and the conversations corresponding to them. These
algorithms assume some global variables, on which all in-
stances of the recursion have shared access. These variables
are the transition system T S of type TS, the AC ¡ Set of
type SetOfPolicy that, for each operation, report the corre-
sponding access control policy P (of type Policy), the G
scc
(of type GraphSCC) and a C¡Bag (of type SetOfSequence),
which is built during the execution of the algorithms, and
represents the set of conversations de¯ning the k-levels.
of c, whereas each Eulerian path, if exists, is a traversing
sequence. This is why we do not impose the uniqueness of
an edge.
Algorithm 1: isNewString()
Input: b: Boolean
Output:
(1) foreach x 2 C ¡ Bag
(2) if x.set() = this.set()
(3) return (false);
(4) return (true);
The isNewString() is a method de¯ned on the object
type Sequence.
Algorithm 2: build()
Input: s: State, str: Sequence
Output:
(1) if s has no out-going transition (i.e., is
a leaf)
(2) if str.isNewString()
(3) C ¡ Bag.add(str);
(4) return ();
(5) else
(6) if s 2 T :F (i.e., s is ¯nal) and
str.isNewString()
(7) if j str.set()j >
G
scc.rank(c(s))
(8) return ();
(9) C ¡ Bag.add(str);
(10) foreach s
a ¡! t
(11) build(t, str ¢ a);
Algorithm 3: buildBag&KLevels()
Input: s: State
Output: C ¡ Bag: SetOfSequence,
K ¡ Bag: SetOfInteger
(1) var C ¡ Bag: SetOfSequence;
(2) var K ¡ Bag: SetOfInteger;
(3) C ¡ Bag := ;;
(4) K ¡ Bag := ;;
(5) build(s,");
(6) foreach str 2 C ¡ Bag
(7) K ¡ Bag.add(str.length());
(8) return C ¡ Bag,K ¡ Bag;
The overall algorithm builds, for each state of the Web
service transition system, the k-levels and the corresponding
conversations.
Algorithm 4: computeOverallBag&KLevels()
(1) var C ¡ Bag ¡ Set: SetOfSetOfSe-
quence;
(2) var K¡Bag¡Set: SetOfSetOfInteger;
(3) foreach s 2 T :§
(4) f C ¡ Bag[s], K ¡ Bag[s] g :=
buildBag&KLevels(s);S5
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Figure 2: A transition system (a) with its G
scc (b)
Example 2. Figure 2(a) represents the transition system
of some Web service. This transition system can be re-
duced to the graph in ¯gure 2(b) containing four strongly
connected components. The di®erent states, representing
each a strongly connected component, are labeled with pairs
(x, y) representing the maximum number of symbols (oper-
ations) and the coverage of that strongly connected compo-
nent respectively. These numbers are then used to calculate
all the k-trustworthiness levels of all states in the transi-
tion system. For example, the k-trustworthiness levels as-
signed to S1 are f2;4;5;7;9g. The longest conversation be-
ing c¢g¢c¢e¢h¢c¢e¢i¢l.
Now that for each state we computed all potential
k-trustworthiness levels and corresponding conversations
(from which to derive conversation policies), the access con-
trol enforcement system can proceed through the following
phases:
² Bootstrapping phase { This phase occurs when the sub-
ject has its ¯rst contact with the Web service. The
enforcement system assigns the initial level of trust k,
amongst all possible ones (as computed previously),
based on the set of initial credentials provided by the
client (e.g., the IP address of the client) and the trust
policies of the Web service. If the initial credentials
are not su±cient, the access control system assign to
him the smallest level of trust, or a default level of
1 (meaning step-by-step access control), or refuse the
access, depending on the trust policies.
² Once the access control enforcement system assigns
a level of trust k to the client, it will ask the client
to provide all the required credentials based on the
associated access policies computed by the previous
algorithm.
² If the subject provides the requested credentials, it can
invoke all operations on paths less or equal to k that
lead to ¯nal states.
² If from a given state, the client decides to continue its
interaction with the Web service through a path di®er-
ent from those assigned by its k-trustworthiness level,
then a new k-level of trust needs to be computed and
assigned to the client. The process will then continue
as before until the client decides to stop.
5. ARCHITECTURE OF THE ENFORCE-
MENT SYSTEM
This section describes how the proposed access control
model for conversation-based Web services can be imple-
mented in Web service environments. The system archi-
tecture is depicted in Figure 3. To be compliant with the
XACML standard, the access control enforcement system is
composed of a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), a Policy
Decision Point (PDP) and a Policy Administration Point
(PAP). The PEP realizes the interface with clients and with
the Execution Controller System (ECS) [2]. The ECS is
not part of the enforcement system: it maintains a copy
of the transition system to keep track of the state of the
conversation between the client and the service. Further,
at deployment time, it generates a table reporting for each
state the k-trustworthiness levels.
The PEP intercepts all the access requests submitted by
clients, specifying the name of an operation the client wants
to perform and/or a set of credentials.
The ¯rst request that a client sends to the PEP contains
both a name of an operation and a set of credentials (step
1). Once received, the PEP contacts the ECS to provide it
information about the operation requested, so it can update
the state of the conversation and can return it to the PEP
with the table (steps 2-3). Then, the PEP, reformulates the
access request adding information about the current state
of the conversation and the table and sends it to the PDP
(step 4). The PDP's k-Trustworthiness Level Assignment
Module (TLA), having received from the PEP the infor-
mation about the current state of the conversation and the
table, queries the table to select the trustworthiness levels
k1;:::;kn. Hence, the TLA Module interacts with the PAP
which manages the policies, to retrieve the k-trust policies
associated with trustworthiness levels k1;:::;kn (step 5-6)
and evaluates if the credentials provided by the client in
the request satisfy one of the policies. If this is the case,
the client is assigned to the trustworthiness level ki asso-
ciated with the ki-trust policy he is compliant with. Once
assigned the trustworthiness level ki, the TLA sends it with
the associated conversations to the PDP's Policy Selection
Module (PS)(step 7). The PS asks the PAP for the access
control policies related to the operations constituting the
conversations, that the client may engage with the service
on the basis of the assigned trustworthiness level ki (steps
8-9). Then, the PS module combines the selected policies to
obtain the corresponding conversation access control policy.
Hence, it returns the policies to the PEP with ki (step 10).
At this point, the PEP asks to the client to provide the cre-
dentials required by the policies and evaluates them against
the policies (steps 11-12). If the check is positive, the client
can perform any operation in the conversations related to
the trustworthiness level ki. Since the PEP stores a copy of
the table of trustworthiness levels and the level ki assigned
to the client, when it submits a request to perform an oper-
ation, which does not belong to the allowed conversations,
the PEP contacts the PDP, which assigns a new trustwor-￿
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Figure 3: System Architecture
thiness level to the client. In this case, the PEP does not
send again the table of trustworthiness levels, but only the
state of the conversation with the client, which is necessary
to select from the table the trustworthiness levels associated
with that state.
The main advantage of the proposed architecture is that is
in conformity with the reference standard for access control
in distributed systems, XACML. Further, it is modular and
allows an easy integration of the access control system in
Web service frameworks. Finally, the enforcement system is
independent from the language used to express k-trust and
access control policies. Both WS-Policy and the XACML
Pro¯le for Web services can be used to represent the policies
characterizing our model.
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a novel approach to deal with
access control in conversation-based Web services. Our ¯rst
contribution is to consider Web services as transition sys-
tems instead of systems that present sets of independent
operations. As we mentioned earlier, most existing access
control approaches assume a single operation model for Web
service where the invocation of operations are independent
from each other.
Moreover, as mentioned previously, two extreme ap-
proaches regarding the disclosure of access policies are pos-
sible: (1) requesting all the credentials needed for all the
operations, and (2) requesting credentials related to each
operation the client is interested in invoking. In this con-
text, our second objective was to strike a balance between
the need to reveal only part of the Web service access policy
and the need to o®er enough assurance to clients that they
can reach a ¯nal state.
In order to support such claims, we develop a very simple
model for measuring the two parameters risk and disclosure.
Given a Web service operation a, we consider Pa as the
probability that the client does not have the credential(s)
satisfying the access control policy guarding the operation.
In general, the risk associated to an event is the product
of the probability that event happens and the damage pro-
duced by the event. In simple terms, the damage of having
the client dropping o® due to lack of authorization is the
number of executed operations. Indeed, executing an oper-
ation requires resources to the service provider, and if the
conversation is suddenly interrupted in a non-¯nal state, all
these resources have been \wasted". In addition, the leakage
in terms of disclosure of access control policies is propor-
tional to the operations already executed. We now evaluate
these two simple metrics risk and leakage faced by a service
provider during a conversation conv = (a1;:::;an).
In a step-by-step enforcement, the risk faced before in-
volving the i-th operation (ai being the next operation for
which the client may not posses the required credential to
access to) is:
Ri = Pai ¢ (i ¡ 1) i = 1:::n (1)
Similarly, the leakage after executing the i-th operation in-
vocation (ai + 1 being the next operation) is:
Li = Pai+1 ¢ i i = 1:::n (2)
In this case, the client may be an attacker that voluntarily
drop-o® the conversation after accessing the previous poli-
cies.
In our conversation-based enforcement, assuming that the
conversation conv is the one for which the service providerMetric Step-by-step Conversation
Risk : §
n
i=1Ri P
n¢(n¡1)
2 0
Leakage : Ln n n
Table 1: Risk and Leakage Evaluation
d
a
b c
e
Figure 4: A simple transition system
has requested all the credentials, we have:
Ri = ¦
n
i=1Pai ¢ 0 = 0 i = 1:::n (3)
Indeed during the conversation, the various invocations of
Web service operations are somehow independent. Thus, the
probability that a client has all the credential(s) needed to
access all the operations is simply ¦
n
i=1Pai = Pa1 ¢:::¢Pan.
However, the service provider has requested credentials for
this conversation, the damage is always 0. The system is safe
about the client having the requirements to reach the end of
the conversation. This is not necessary since the client can
choose a di®erent operation.
Since the enforcement system has required all the creden-
tials at the beginning, the leakage is:
Li = Pai ¢ n i = 1:::n (4)
Table 1 summarizes the risk and leakage, after the con-
versation conv, for our approach and for a step-by-step ap-
proach assuming that all Pai are equals, i.e, 8i : Pai = P.
Let us now compare the possible approaches to access con-
trol enforcement on a simple Web service having the behav-
ior represented as in Figure 4.
Table 2 shows the results for the step-by-step enforce-
ment, the conversation-based (with the 2 possible k-levels,
2 and 4), and the request-all approach. We consider both
the possible conversations. Speci¯cally, in the case of the
conversation acde, with the client assigned a k-level of 2,
if after one step the client chooses an operation it has not
been authorized yet, and it is assigned a k-level of 4 { the
only possible, the risk is given by the damage { 1 step { for
3 ¢P (the probability of not having the credential for the
remaining 3 steps).
Hence, it becomes clear that the k-level model is a trade-
o® between the request-all approach, that always minimizes
the risk by maximizing the disclosure, and the step-by-step,
which minimizes the disclosure by maximizing the risk. If
good client pro¯les (obtained by logs, etc.) are available, the
trust policies can be ¯ne tuned to have most of the clients
assigned to the correct k-level, i.e., the one that e®ectively
the client will follow, thus obtaining the best of the two
extreme approaches.
Table 3 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of
the di®erent approaches regarding access control and disclo-
Metric step-by-
step
k-level:
2
k-level:
4
request-
all
ab
Risk 2 ¢ P 0 0 0
Leakage 2 2 5 5
acde
Risk 6 ¢ P 0 + 3 ¢ P 0 0
Leakage 4 5 5 5
Table 2: Comparison of the various approaches on
a simple Web service
sure of access policies. It shows that our solution takes a
more balanced approach and provides more °exibility. On
one hand, it gives some guarantees to the client that once it
provides the requested credentials, it will eventually reach a
¯nal state. On the other hand, the Web service retain some
control on the disclosure of its access policy.
Policy Dis-
closure
Advantages Disadvantages
Disclose the
entire access
policy
The client can reach
any ¯nal state if
it possesses the re-
quired credentials
The client has access
to the entire policy
Disclose only
the portion as-
sociated with
the requested
operation
The client has very
limited knowledge
on the access policy
The client is so-
licited frequently
and may reach a
state in which it
cannot progress
Disclose only
the portion as-
sociated with
k-trust level
Only a small por-
tion of the policy is
disclosed. It maxi-
mizes the likelihood
the client reaches a
¯nal state.
The client may still
take a path di®erent
from the authorized
ones
Table 3: Access control strategies
As part of our future work we would like to integrate
our approach with an exception-based mechanism tailored
to support access control enforcement. In particular, in a
step-by-step approach, whenever a client cannot complete a
conversation because of the lack of authorization, some alter-
native actions and operations are taken by the Web service.
A typical action would be to suspend the execution of the
conversation, ask the user to acquire the missing credentials,
and then resume the execution of the conversation; such a
process would require investigating a number of issues, such
as determining the state information that need to be main-
tained, and whether revalidation of previous authorizations
is needed when resuming the execution. A di®erent action
would be to determine whether alternative operations can
be performed to replace the operation that the user cannot
execute because of the missing authorization. We would like
to develop a language according to which one can express
the proper handling of error situations arising from the lack
of authorization.
A natural next step for our work is to extend our ac-
cess control model to composite services. We need composi-
tion when a client request cannot be satis¯ed by any avail-
able service, but by suitably combining parts of available
Web services. Composition involves usually two di®erent
issues [5]: synthesis is concerned with synthesizing a speci¯-
cation of how to coordinate the component services to ful¯ll
the client request; orchestration relates to the enactment ofthe composite service and the coordination among services,
by executing the speci¯cation produced by the composition
synthesis.
Access control needs to be addressed at the orchestration
level to manage the client's credentials needed to access the
di®erent service components and the access policies of these
services. The objective is to extend the notions of conversa-
tion access control policy and k-trustworthiness to composite
services. We are still assuming a conversation-based model
for Web services. In addition, all component services sup-
port our k-trustworthiness model. Thus each service com-
pute a local k or trust level and the challenge would be to
compute a global trust level in an e®ective and e±cient way.
We need to determine the credentials to request from the
client that will lead to a ¯nal state.
In addition, Web services may fail or ask for credentials
that cannot be provided by clients. In addition to the ideas
presented earlier on suspending the current conversation or
replacing the operations, another potential approach is to to
devise a substitutability scheme [8] where the \failing" ser-
vice is substituted with a new Web service that has at least
the same behavior and that is access control-compatible with
the composite service and the current state. This would
require addressing several challenging issues including com-
puting a new global trust level, deriving new credentials
from existing ones, and devising techniques on how to deal
with the work done so far by the Web service being substi-
tuted.
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